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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the rights and responsibilities vested in common carriers
tempered their market power in exchange for reduced liability or insula-
tion from commercial and personal damages caused by the content
carried.' Providers of neutral and transparent conduits did not have to
monitor the content carried, nor could they typically refuse access2 to
* Mr. Frieden holds a B.A. degree from the University of Pennsylvania (1977) and a
J.D. degree from the University of Virginia (1980). Mr. Frieden is an Associate Professor with
the College of Communications at Penn State University. Mr. Frieden can be reached by mail
at 201-D Carnegie Building, University Park, PA, 16802, by phone at (814) 863-7996 or by e-
mail at mf5@psu.edu.
1. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros., 256 U.S. 566 (1921) (exculpatory
clauses in common carrier tariff limited liability to refunding cost of carriage despite substantial
financial damage resulting from non-delivery of an message transmitted only once). See also
Christy Cornell Kunin, Unilateral Tariff Exculpation in the Era of Competitive Telecommuni-
cations, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 907 (1992) (an examination of exculpation of common carrier
liability).
2. See, e.g., In re Bell System Tariff Offerings of Local Distribution Facilities for Use by
Other Common Carriers, 46 F.C.C.2d 413 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. FCC,
503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1026, reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975);
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978) (access to
local exchange facilities mandated); In re Establishment of Domestic Communication-Satellite
Facilities by Nongovernmental Entities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86, 97 (1970), pol'y reaffd, 34 F.C.C.2d
9, 64-5, adopted, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, 856 (1972), on recon., 38 F.C.C.2d 665 (1972) (domestic
satellite policy mandates non-discriminatory, diverse, and flexible access to domestic satellites
and earth station facilities); accord, In re Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consid-
eration of Application to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public
Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 940 (1971) (AT&T required to
afford local exchange facility access to competing inter-city carriers), on recon., 35 F.C.C.2d
1106 (1971), affd sub nom. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm. v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1192 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975). In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll
Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, recon. denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968) (invalidating local
exchange carrier tariff restrictions on interconnection of customer premises equipment with the
telephone network); In re Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974), affd sub nom.
North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027
(1976); In re Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll
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their bottleneck3 facilities on the basis of content Non-common carriers,
on the other hand, could operate as private carriers when transporting
content whether over spectrum, e.g., satellite operators,5 or via closed
circuit media, e.g., cable television operators. Their regulatory status
derived from the manner in which they carried content and to whom such
carriage services were made available: non-common carriers did not op-
erate essential facilities and did not serve as gatekeepers who could affect
the price and availability of content. Having chosen to select and
monitor content, they had to assume the greater risk of liability for the
content carried, published or distributed.7 The potential for civil and
Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), 56 F.C.C.2d 593
(1975), recon., 58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976) (second order), aff'd sub nom. North Carolina Util.
Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977) (preempting the
states on the matter of customer premises equipment interconnection with the telephone net-
work).
3. "A firm controlling bottleneck facilities has the ability to impede access of its com-
petitors to those facilities. We must be in a position to contend with this type of potential abuse.
We treat control of bottleneck facilities as prima facie evidence of market power requiring
detailed regulatory scrutiny.... Control of bottleneck facilities is present when a firm or group
of firms has sufficient command over some essential commodity or facility in its industry or
trade to be able to impede new entrants. Thus bottleneck control describes the structural char-
acteristic of a market that new entrants must either be allowed to share the bottleneck facility or
fall." In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and
Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 85 FCC 2d 1, 36 (1980). See also United States v. Terminal
R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (first order) (antitrust court ordered railroads to provide com-
petitors equivalent access to bottleneck railway terminal facilities), appealed after remand, 236
U.S. 194 (1915); In re An Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz
for Cellular Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 495-96 (1981) (Commission required
telephone companies to furnish interconnection to cellular systems upon terms no less favorable
than those used by or offered to wireline carriers), modified, 89 F.C.C.2d 58 (1982), further
modified, 90 F.C.C.2d 571 (1982); In re Need to Promote. Competition and Efficient Use of
Spectrum for Radio Common Carrier Services, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1275 (1986), clarified,
2 F.C.C.2d 2910 (1987), affid on recon., 4 F.C.C.R. 2369 (1989) (Commission clarified poli-
cies regarding interconnection of cellular and other radio common carrier facilities to landline
network); Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092, 1103-06 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (court
upheld Commission's order requiring Lincoln to provide interconnection facilities to MCI);
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978);
Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1026 (1975),
reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975).
4. See, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (upholding a fed-
eral statute prohibiting obscene telephone messages, but overturning application of the statute
to adult access to indecent messages via telecommunications common carriers that are entitled
to First Amendment protection).
5. See Wold Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding
FCC decision approving non-common carrier leasing of satellite transponders).
6. See Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), affid, 440 U.S. 689
(1979) (cable television held not to be common carriage).
7. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710,
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
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criminal liability justified their active assessment whether to carry a par-
ticular message, or type of content.8
Recently, regulators and courts have considered the extent to which
carriers can decide what content to carry, e.g., as electronic publishers
whose editorial discretion includes the decision whether and how to carry
particular content. The distinction between common carriers and private
carriers has grown murky, because of:
(1) legislative and regulatory tinkering with the common carrier
model;9
(2) technological innovations;
(3) a growing body of cases articulating robust First Amend-
ment speaker rights for common carriers; and
(4) court cases imposing quasi-common carrier obligations on
private carriers (e.g., the duty of cable television operators to
carry broadcast television signals)," and quasi-publisher du-
ties on common carriers (e.g., the duty to inquire and
disclose whether content is obscene or indecent).
This article will examine court cases and actions by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) that distort the traditional concepts
of common and private carriage by establishing new rights and responsi-
bilities previously applicable to the other category of carrier. This article
will also consider the feasibility of (a) maintaining the traditional com-
mon carrier regulatory model and (b) continuing the application of that
model to basic services provided by local exchange carriers (LECs). This
is especially important as LECs qualify to become private carriers tap-
ping new market opportunities, even within the same geographical region
where they provide basic services. Finally, this article examines the cir-
cumstances that continue to require application of the "pure" common
carrier model (e.g., the FCC currently regulates the telecommunication
transport operations of Comsat Corporation, but does not regulate its
non-carrier ventures).
8. For a discussion of an information service provider's civil liability for defamation,
etc., see Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the
First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L. REv. 1639 (1995).
9. See Rob Frieden, Contamination of the Common Carrier Concept in Telecommunica-
tions, 19 TELECOmm. POL'Y 685 (1995).
10. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 129 L. Ed. 2d
497 (1994).
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II. WHITHER COMMON CARRIAGE?
Modifications to the common carrier model have made it difficult, if
not impossible, to maintain conventional common carrier regulation of
basic communication services. Some commentators view this develop-
ment as inevitable,' or as an outcome that would eliminate a less
desirable policy option." This article argues that the difficulty in apply-
ing the common carrier model'3 may prevent government from creating
effective incentives for carriers to provide ubiquitous access to the devel-
oping broadband digital telecommunication infrastructure."
Common carriers have opportunities to, and legitimate business rea-
sons for pursuing non-common carrier markets. Even if it is regulated as
a common carrier for one line of business, an enterprise is not precluded
from pursuing ventures outside the scope of common carrier regulation.
11. Professor Eli Noam identifies the demise of common carriage as a predictable conse-
quence of the evolution in telecommunications from a network of networks to a systems of
systems. Questions of market access and the terms and conditions of interconnection become
less important when networks, service providers and types of players proliferate. But Professor
Noam does identify a number of responsibilities, historically managed by common carriers and
their government overseers, e.g., universal services, interoperability and physical interconnec-
tion. If common carriers need not address these obligations, or can agree to perform some of
them in exchange for further deregulation, what guarantee exists that a larger, more diverse and
heterogeneous set of system operators will find it in their enlightened self interest to assume the
responsibility? Professor Noam suggests the need for new policy instruments that emphasize
neutral interconnection: an obligation to interconnect with and deliver the traffic of any other
carrier once a carrier itself seeks interconnection with another carrier. Eli M. Noam, Beyond
Liberalization: From the Network of Networks to the System of Systems, 18 TELECOIzi. POL'Y
286 (1994); Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common Car-
riage, 18 TELECOMM. POL'Y 435 (1994).
12. "Common-carriage regulation, however, should not be viewed as a panacea. Just be-
cause it can be implemented lawfully does not mean it will work well. Indeed, we suspect that,
for most [mass] media, a thoughtful policy analyst will reject the common carrier model."
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for Con-
verging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719,1738 (1995).
13. Ironically, while the Telecommunications Act of 1996 expressly states the intention
not to modify, impair, or supersede anything in the Communications Act of 1934, unless so
provided in the law, its tinkering with the common carrier concept makes it more likely that
application of the pure model will not be sustained. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(c)
(1), Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 143, reprinted in Historical and Statutory Notes, 47
U.S.C.A. § 152(1996). See also Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 601(a) (1), Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 143, reprinted in Historical and Statutory Notes, 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 152(1996) (applicability of consent decrees). The Act authorizes the FCC to forbear from
enforcing any regulation or provision of the Act if the Commission determines that such en-
forcement is not necessary to guard against discrimination, to ensure just and reasonable
services, to protect consumers, and to serve the public interest. 47 U.S.C.A. § 160(a) (1996).
14. See, e.g., Information Infrastructure Task Force, National Information Infrastructure
Agenda For Action (1993); Andrew D. Auerbach, Mandatory Access and the Information In-
frastructure, 3 CommLaw Conspectus 1 (1995) (discussing existing and proposed mandatory
access laws); Fred H, Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure,
30 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (1995).
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However, the option of pursuing non-common carrier markets should not
impede government agencies from engaging in ongoing common carrier
regulation, because such entry may require structural and other regula-
tory safeguards to ensure that new ventures do not adversely impact a
company's ongoing common carrier obligations. 5 In short, the freedom
to enter new markets under a different regulatory status by itself should
not exempt the enterprise from ongoing common carrier regulation in
previously-served markets.
Government does need to refine the common carrier model to elimi-
nate aspects of "command and control" that create substantial barriers to
market entry and impede the ability of incumbents to compete. But in
refining the model to emphasize flexibility and reduced regulation where
possible, government should not render the core concept unsustainable
for existing and prospective services still warranting basic common car-
rier regulation.
1Il. COMMON CARRIER PUBLISHERS AND PRIVATE CARRIERS SEEKING
COMMON CARRIER PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Courts provide a key forum for determining whether and how
changed circumstances support tinkering with the common carrier model.
Recent cases include determinations of:
(1) local exchange carriers' First Amendment rights to diversify
into cable television and information services;'
6
(2) the extent of liability applicable to on-line information serv-
ices that have distributed allegedly defamatory'7or copyright
infringing material;'8
15. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 imposes such structural safeguards on a Bell
Operating Company's entry into inter-LATA interexchange telecommunication services and
equipment manufacturing previously prohibited by the Modification of Final Judgment. 47
U.S.C. § 271 (1996).
16. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Virginia v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D.
Va. 1993), affd 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 2608, 132 L.Ed.2d 852
(1995); US West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 48 F.3d
1092 (9th Cir. 1994); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N. D. Ala. 1994);
Ameritech Corp. v. U.S., 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. M11. 994). See Laurence H. Winer, Telephone
Companies Have First Amendment Rights Too: The Constitutional Case for Entry Into Cable, 8
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 257 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
18. See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(finding electronic bulletin board operator liable for allowing a user to infringe on trademarks
and copyrights by posting images onto its bulletin board).
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(3) cable television operators' duties to carry broadcast televi-
sion signals; 9 and
(4) the statutory and regulatory duties imposed on common car-
riers that the FCC can eliminateO as part of its deregulatory
campaign to achieve a level competitive playing field among
common carriers subject to different degrees of rate regula-
tion, and between regulated common and unregulated private
carriers.2
Common carriers have recently acquired some of the rights and re-
sponsibilities of private carriers, including the easily invoked option of
refusing carriage, and the duty to pre-qualify certain "candidates" for
carriage to determine that they will not disseminate obscenity, make in-
decent content readily accessible to minors, or tarnish the reputation of
the carrier.' Private carriers eagerly seek the immunity from civil and
criminal liability historically accorded common carriers, but wish to
avoid the accompanying regulatory oversight and duties to provide uni-
versal and non-discriminatory service. 3 The convergence of markets and
technologies encourages both incumbents and newcomers to object to
19. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 129 L. Ed. 2d
497 (1994).
20. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 401, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 128
(1996), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 160 (1996) authorizes the FCC to forbear from applying any
provision of the Communications Act and existing Commission regulations when it determines
that such oversight is not necessary to ensure just and reasonable rates, consumer protection,
and service in the public interest. Soon after enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
the Commission initiated a proceeding designed to eliminate the tariff filing requirement for
long distance common carriers providing interstate services. See Policy and Rules Concerning
the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, 1I F.C.C.R. 9564 (1996) (implementation of section
254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended).
21. In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services
and Facilities Therefor, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979) (notice of inquiry and proposed rulemaking);
First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980); Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59
(1982), recon. denied, 93 F.C.C.2d 54 (1983); Third Report and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791
(1983); Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983), rev'd and remanded sub. nom.
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Fifth Report and Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984); Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985), rev'd and remanded
sub nom. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd sub nom. MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
22. See Carlin Comms., Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th
Cir. 1987) (affirming right of telephone company to terminate an adult programming telephone
service as a matter of business judgment), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988). See also Ellen L.
Nagel, First Amendment Constraints on the Regulation of Telephone Pornography, 55 U. CIN.
L. REv. 237 (1986); Cindy L. Petersen, The Congressional Response to the Supreme Court's
Treatment of Dial-a-Porn, 78 GEo. L.J. 2025 (1990).
23. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (on-line in-
formation services provider who assigned editing/moderating function of an electronic bulletin
board to a third party not liable for allegedly defamatory material on electronic bulletin board).
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any barriers to market entry.24 Non-common carriers have whittled away
at regulations that reserved markets to common carriers' while common
carriers have pursued legislative and judicial remedies' to eliminate any
barriers to their market entry and provision of other types of telecommuni-
cation or information service even in markets where they provide common
carrier services.? Market diversification by common carriers makes it diffi-
cult to sustain divergent regulatory regimes and interpretations of First
24. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Virginia v. United States, 830 F. Supp.
909 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct.
1036, 134 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1996) (remanded to consider mootness).
25. See e.g., In re Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities, 7
F.C.C.R. 7369 (1992) (order and notice of proposed rulemaking) (proposing to mandate physi-
cal co-location of private carrier facilities on Local Exchange Carrier premises to promote
facilities-based competition for local switched services), on recon., 8 F.C.C.R. 127 (1992), on
further recon., 8 F.C.C.R. 7341 (1993) (second reconsideration order), vacated in part and
remanded sub nom. Bell Atlantic, Inc. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (deeming physi-
cal co-location an unlawful taking of property), on remand, 9 F.C.C.R. 5154 (1994) (proposing
virtual co-location). See also In re Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company
Facilities, Transport Phase n1, 9 F.C.C.R. 2718 (1994); In re Local Exchange Carriers' Rates,
Terms, and Conditions for Expanded Interconnection Through Virtual Collocation for Special
Access and Switched Transport, Phase I, 10 F.C.C.R. 11116 (1995); In re Transport Rate
Structure and Pricing, 7 F.C.C.R. 7006 (1992) (order and further notice of proposed rulemak-
ing) (transport is a component of interstate switched access, which LECs provide to enable
interexchange carriers (IXCs) and other customers to originate and terminate interstate switched
telecommunications traffic and where transport constitutes the local transmission between cus-
tomer points of presence (POPs) and LEC end offices, where local switching occurs), on
further recon., 8 F.C.C.R. 5370 (1993) (first reconsideration order), on further recon., 8
F.C.C.R. 6233 (1993) (second reconsideration order), on further recon., FCC 94-325 (released
Dec. 22, 1994) (third reconsideration order and notice of proposed rulemaking).
26. To appreciate the extent to which Congress has considered and previously failed to
enact telecommunication legislation see Telecommunications Act of 1996, S. REP. No. 104-
230, pts. 1-2, (February 1, 1996); H.R. 1555; H.R. REp. No. 104-204, pts. 1-4 (July 24, 1996);
104-223 (August 1, 1995); S. 652; S. REP. No. 104-23 (March 30, 1995); H.R. 3626; H.R.
REP. No. 103-559, pts. 1-2 (June 24, 1994); HR 3626; H.R. REp. No. 103-560 (June 24,
1994); S. 1822; S. REP. No. 103-367, pts. 1-2 (September 14, 1994).
27. See, e.g., Information Infrastructure Task Force, National Information Infrastructure
Agenda For Action (1993); Andrew D. Auerbach, Mandatory Access and the Information In-
frastructure, 3 CommLaw Conspectus 1 (1995) (discussing existing and proposed mandatory
access laws); Fred H, Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure,
30 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (1995)
28. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 613(b) (1) makes it unlawful for a
common carrier subject to Title 1I of the Communications Act to provide video programming
directly to subscribers in its telephone service area, either directly or indirectly through an af-
filiate owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under common control with the common
carrier. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780 (1984) codified at 47 U.S.C. A. § 533(b) (1) (1992)
implemented at 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(b). The 1984 Cable Act prevents LECs and their affiliates to
provide video programming directly to subscribers in their telephone service area. Because the
cross-ownership prohibition addresses programming not ownership, a telephone company may
acquire a cable television company that operates within the telephone company's service area,
provided it does not provide the programming. See, e.g., In re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.,
57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1003 (1985) (approving construction by a telephone company of fa-
cilities to be used for cable television by an unaffiliated programmer).
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Amendment freedoms dependent on the medium involved." Diversifica-
tion also may prevent regulators from applying the common carrer
model to new technologies or services that warrant such government in-
volvement, because they involve a novel definition of basic
telecommunications. Despite the clamor for deregulation and open mar-
ket entry, there is little support for abandoning regulation of basic
telecommunication services involving the common carrier transmission
of voice, data, and video programming generated either by unaffiliated
customers or corporate affiliates.
A key challenge in telecommunication regulation lies in balancing
the need to retain essential common carrier regulation (whether provided
by a monopolist or under competitive conditions) with the need to adjust
to changing circumstances (e.g., evolving competition and technological
innovations). Incumbent common carriers claim that a "level competitive
playing field" can exist only if regulators abandon common carrier obli-
gations (e.g., filing tariffs)," or reclassify some functions into private
carriage (e.g., substituting private contracts for public tariffs)." These
carriers have bolstered their economic and regulatory rationale with First
Amendment arguments that commercial speech rights prohibit govern-
ment foreclosure of market access.
By emphasizing First Amendment concerns, these advocates want
government decision-makers to view cross-ownership restrictions (e.g.,
the ban on the common ownership of cable and telephone companies in
29. See Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking the
Cycle of Repression, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247 (1994).
30. On two separate occasions, an appellate court has ruled that the FCC could not accord
non-dominant carriers the option of refraining from filing tariffs. See American Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992) and the mandatory detariffing of services; MCI Tele-
comms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affd sub nor. MCI Telecomms. Corp.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994). However, the Telecommunications Act of
1996 makes it possible for the FCC unilaterally to forbear from applying statutory provisions
even in the absence of Congressional action to repeal such provisions. See supra note 20.
31. A carrier cannot "vitiate its common carrier status merely by entering into private
contractual relationships with its customers." Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475,
1481 (D.C. Cir. 1994). On the other hand, "it does not make sense that the filing of the terms of
any contract-no matter how customer tailored-with the FCC, without more, reflects a con-
scious decision to offer the service to all takers on a common carrier basis." Id.
32. Entry by telephone companies into cable television and other information service mar-
kets supports the "diversity principle" of the First Amendment, i.e., that a multiplicity of
speakers will maximize freedom of expression. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1, 20 (1945) (First Amendment goal is to ensure "the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources"). But speaker and publisher freedoms that permit
telephone companies to deny access, which they could not do under the common carrier model,
vitiates diversity unless robust competition exists and the telephone company has no bottleneck
control. "[A]ssuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a gov-
ernmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment."
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1994).
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the same geographical area and other limits on market access) as an in-
fringement of the right to free and diverse speech. They assume the
absence of bottlenecks, essential facilities, and the lack of centralized
gatekeepers with the market power to affect the price or supply of serv-
ice. If these things do exist and impede competition or restrict the
marketplace of ideas, then content-neutral, narrowly drawn time, place,
and manner restrictions remain legitimate conditions. On the other hand,
the government needs to recognize that private carriers welcome any op-
portunity to capitalize on an artificial competitive advantage created by
the refusal of regulators, legislators, and courts to modify traditional
common carrier burdens placed only on incumbent carriers.
IV. THE CONVENTIONAL VIEw OF LEC COMMON CARRIAGE
Much of the existing LEC infrastructure provides the functionality
needed to access either basic common carrier and enhanced, private car-
rier services such as cable television and on-line information services.
LECs provide essential "first and last mile" services that link customers
(at their businesses or residences) with companies providing long dis-
tance and information services. While proliferating access options (e.g.,
satellite, wireless, and wireline terrestrial facilities) may abate or elimi-
nate bottleneck control, the vast majority of business and residential
subscribers to information and entertainment services currently rely on a
limited set of largely one-way channels for access to the mass media,33
and a single twisted wire pair (provided exclusively by an LEC) for ac-
cess to two-way voice and data services.
The AT&T divestiture decree established a market demarcation be-
tween local exchange and interexchange services.3 It also established a
distinction between (1) permissible basic exchange access and exchange
telecommunications,35 and (2) other lines of business, like information
33. "The decentralized, open-access model presents a sharp contrast to the centralized,
one-way channel model that typifies most mass media today." Jerry Berman & Daniel J.
Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amend-
ment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1623 (1995).
34. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-234 (D.D.C. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1001 (D.D.C. 1982). This consent decree, a modification of final judg-
ment (MFJ), settled an antitrust suit brought by the federal government in 1974 alleging an
unlawful combination within the Bell System resulting in the monopolization of both long
distance telephone service and the manufacture of telecommunications equipment.
35. The MFJ specified that the core lines of business of the divested Bell Operating Com-
panies (BOCs) to be exchange telecommunications and exchange access functions, i.e., local
and long distance services within a geographical service region known as a Local Access and
Transport Area (LATA). Section IV(G) of the MFJ defines a LATA as "one or more contigu-
ous local exchange areas serving common social, economic, and other purposes, even where
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and interexchange services." The FCC's Computer Inquiries have main-
tained a similar regulatory distinction between basic services (which
LECs provide on a common carrier basis) and enhanced services
(provided by LECs and competitors alike on a private carrier basis). Both
the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) and the FCC's Computer In-
quiries assume that LECs will operate as common carriers, providing (a)
essential building blocks for the enhancement of plain vanilla transmis-
sion lines, and (b) access to and from users who may have no other
viable access option. Presumably, regulatory oversight can ensure both
the continuing non-discriminatory availability of basic transmission ca-
pacity and a level competitive playing field between unaffiliated private
carriers and corporate affiliates securing basic transport.
The opportunity to provide enhanced services (e.g., cable television
and on-line information services) create the incentive for LECs to up-
grade the telecommunication infrastructure's ability to support
broadband, digital transmission streams. However, some industry ob-
servers have expressed concern that in the absence of rigorous common
carrier regulatory oversight, LECs may ignore the primary task of im-
proving ubiquitous, low-priced Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS),
and instead concentrate on higher margin, Pretty Advanced New Stuff
(PANS) targeted to "redlined" neighborhoods likely to generate a high
subscription rate in view of ample discretionary income and prior pur-
chases of required ancillary equipment like personal computers and
modems." When providing PANS, LECs typically do not incur the tra-
ditional common carrier duties of:
such configuration transcends municipal or other local governmental boundaries." Id. at 229.
The 163 LATAs created by the MFJ can be as large as a state, e.g., New Mexico, but typically
represent a portion of one state. Section II(A) of the MFJ requires the BOCs to provide ex-
change access "on an unbundled, tariffed basis that is equal in type, quality, and price to that
provided to AT&T." ld. at 227.
36. In United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987), Judge Greene
held that the RBOCs had failed to make an affirmative showing that they would lack ability to
use their monopoly power anticompetitively, when providing information services, because
they retained bottleneck power over the local loop. He declined to amend that decision, 690 F.
Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1987), but subsequently allowed the RBOCs to engage in transmission of
information, including voice storage and retrieval, but not in the generation of content. United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988). On appeal, the D.C. Circuit af-
firmed in part, but reversed the lower court's decision to use the more burdensome Line of
Business waiver standard established in Section VII(c) of the MFJ instead of the more liberal
standard established in Section VII applicable when no party to the MFJ opposes a waiver
grant. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990). On remand, Judge
Greene held that while the RBOCs still possessed market power information services, within
the meaning of the antitrust laws, he had to apply the more liberal waiver standard as mandated
by the Court of Appeals. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991).
37. In May 1994, a coalition of five consumer organizations filed two separate petitions
asking the FCC to: (1) ensure that video dialtone facilities are deployed in a nondiscriminatory
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(1) providing non-discriminatory, universal access; and
(2) operating as a quasi-public enterprise offering "transparent"
capacity, i.e., carriage of content selected by the subscriber.s
V. DIVERGING ROLES AND MISSIONS
A variety of new economic and legal rationales allow common carri-
ers to avoid providing non-discriminatory access to some services. The
FCC can simply decide that a particular activity constitutes a non-
common carrier activity, even if it involves signal transport (e.g., en-
hanced services) or provides ancillary functions (e.g., LEC billing and
collecting payment for services provided by an unaffiliated company that
also may use LEC common carrier services). Or a court may consider
transport services performed by a common carrier something other than
common carriage. Additionally, the Telecommunications Act of 1996
provides a powerful deregulatory option allowing the FCC to "forbear
from applying any regulation or any provision of this Act" if the
manner and that services are made available universally, and (2) commence ruIlemaking to
modify the Section 214 application process to ensure equitable introduction of video dialtone
and public involvement in the application process. The coalition consists of the Center for Me-
dia Education, Consumer Federation of America, Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the Na-
tional Council of La Raza. See Petition for Relief from Unjust and Unreasonable
Discrimination in the Deployment of Video Dialtone Facilities (filed May 23, 1994); Petition
for Rulemaking to Adapt the Section 214 Process to the Construction of Video Dialtone Facili-
ties (filed May 23, 1994). "In the petition for relief, the Petitioners again allege that there are
indications of 'electronic redlining' in the construction applications of several Regional Bell
Operating Companies (RBOCs). The Petitioners state that the RBOCs propose to bypass many
lower income and/or minority communities in their initial deployment of video dialtone service.
The Petitioners argue that this is a discriminatory practice inconsistent with the goal of univer-
sal service as established in the Communications AcL" Pleading Cycle Established for
Comments on Petition for Rulemaking and Petition for Relief in Section 214 Video Dialtone
Application Process, 9 F.C.C.R. 3036 (June 13, 1994).
38. In National Assoc. of Regulatory Util. Comm'r v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed an FCC decision to refrain from applying common carrier status to a new type of
terrestrial mobile radio service. The FCC chose to classify Specialized Mobile Radio Service
(SMRS) as non-common carriage because the operators would enter the marketplace without a
captive subscriber base, i.e., users having no option but to use SMRS, and no market power,
i.e., the ability to affect the price or supply of land mobile radio services.
The court upheld the Commission's non-common carrier determination because it could
find no "substantial likelihood that SMRS will hold themselves out to serve indifferently those
who seek to avail themselves of their particular services." Id at 642. A telecommunications
common carrier must "offer indiscriminate service to whatever public its service may legally
and practically be of use." Id The court noted that SMRS operators typically offer service on a
medium-to-long term contractual basis and concluded that the FCC acted reasonably in classi-
fying SMRS as non-common carriage.
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Commission declares that (a) enforcement is unnecessary to ensure just
and reasonable rates and practices, (b) enforcement of such regulation is
unnecessary to protect consumers, and (c) forbearance is consistent with
the public interest.39
In Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Co., the Ninth Circuit concluded that an LEC could refuse to
carry all sexually-oriented audio programming, regardless of whether
such programming constituted obscenity, or whether the carrier could
provide transport services without liability.' The court drew a parallel to
the adjudicated right of telephone companies operating as non-common
carrier publishers of Yellow Page directories to refuse to carry a particu-
lar listing.41 The court could draw such a parallel only if it equated
Yellow Page advertising (a non-common carrier activity) with the trans-
port of messages from one point to another (traditionally considered
common carriage). The court made such a link by refusing to define the
ability of local exchange telephone companies to deliver the same mes-
sage simultaneously to thousands of subscribers as common carriage,
stating:
[W]e question whether state public utility law in its traditional
form makes sense as applied to Mountain Bell's 976 network.
The technology of that network differs fundamentally from that
of basic phone service. As pointed out above, individuals do not
speak to each other on the 976 lines. Instead, "over 7,900 callers
can be connected simultaneously to the same recorded message."
Under these circumstances the telephone is serving as a medium
by which Carlin broadcasts its messages. The phone company re-
sembles less a common carrier than it does a small radio station.42
39. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 401, 47 U.S.C. 160 (1996). Soon after enactment
of the Act, the FCC proposed to eliminate the tariff filing requirement for non-dominant inter-
exchange carriers. See In re Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange
Marketplace, CC Docket No. 96-61, Second Report and Order, FCC 96-424, 1996 WL
633345 (F.C.C.) (rel. October 31, 1996).
40. Carlin Comms., Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1293-94 (9th
Cir. 1987).
41. Ild. at 1294 (analogizing decision in Dollar A Day Rent A Car Systems, Inc. v. Moun-
tain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 526 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1974), which found that refusal
of a telephone company Yellow Pages subsidiary to publish a listing containing price informa-
tion as non-discriminatory).
42. Carlin Comms. v. Mountain States, 827 F.2d at 1294 (citation omitted). See also Car-
lin Comm., Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1357-61 (lth Cir. 1986)
(permitting tariff with content restrictions on material qualifying for First Amendment protec-
tion as legitimate business judgment); Network Comms. v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 703 F.
Supp. 1267, 1274 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (affirming telephone company decision to cut off billing
and collection services for a dial-a-porn operator).
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In an increasing number of scenarios, common carriers select where
to provide service and whom to serve on variable, market-based terms
and conditions.43 Government officials have not fully come to grips with
the consequences of having a business enterprise that has historically
been regulated as a common carrier also operating in some market seg-
ments under a significantly different regulatory and legal regime. Where
content involves obscenity, indecency, libel, defamation, or otherwise
might render the carrier liable for damages or fines, common carriers can
assume the role of electronic publishers free to determine the worthiness
of material for carriage. Some courts have extended the non-carrier, pub-
lisher status to carriers who refuse to provide tariffed transport services to
certain types of service providers, based on the nature of the content. If
the carrier can characterize the service as public, even though content
originates at one point and disseminates to many in a closed network en-
vironment, then it can refuse carriage on the grounds that providing
service would adversely affect its business.
In Carlin Communications, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the view that
a common carrier can avoid traditional common carrier responsibilities,
even for tariffed services, if it can characterize the service as public,
rather than private communications:
Once the telephone company becomes a medium for public
rather than private communication, the fit of traditional common
carrier law becomes much less snug. Arizona may, of course, de-
cide to make the phone company operate the 976 network as a
content-neutral public forum open to any and all speakers. We
are very reluctant, however, to infer such a principle from tradi-
tional public utility law."
Professor Jerome A. Barron argues that "[b]usiness judgment in
these cases sounds suspiciously like editorial judgment,"4 a common
right of broadcasters and newspaper publishers, but one that does not
accord with the traditional non-discrimination, neutral conduit definition
43. See In re Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, 6 F.C.C.R. 5880,
5906-08 (1991), on recon., 6 F.C.C.R. 7569 (1991), further recon., 7 F.C.C.R. 2677 (1992),
further recon., 8 F.C.C.R. 2659 (1993), further recon., 10 F.C.C.R. 4562 (1995). "Contract
carriage would further benefit consumers by unleashing competitive forces for business serv-
ices to the maximum extent possible. By permitting customers to seek competitive bids from all
carriers in the long-distance market-and allowing AT&T to offer customers the same types of
contract deals that its competitors are already offering-contract carriage will expand custom-
ers' choices." Id, at 105.
44. Carlin Comms. v. Mountain States, 827 F.2d at 1294-95 (citation omitted).
45. Jerome A. Barron, The Telco, the Common Carrier Model and the First Amendment-
The "Dial-A-Porn" Precedent, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371,386 (1993).
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of common carriage." Professor Barron perceives "a disturbing willing-
ness to grant exemptions from the common carrier principle when that
principle proves troublesome to the carrier"--particularly in light of car-
riers' direct involvement in information and video services.' '47
Can LECs operate under different regulatory regimes without abus-
ing their increasingly ample discretion whether to accept common carrier
responsibilities? Will those common carriers qualified to also operate
as private carriers refrain from commingling costs or misallocating in-
vestments for anticompetitive and predatory purposes, particularly in
view of the reluctance of the FCC to impose structural separation be-
tween basic and enhanced corporate affiliates?"8 The risk and
46. The court in Carlin Comms. v. Mountain States "is really saying here that the telco can
censor an information service even though a state statute could not. The reason the state could
not effect such censorship is that it would violate the First Amendment. But if one views the
telco as a private actor, then a telco's decision to prohibit the transmission of a certain category
of messages-in this case, Carlin's 'adult entertainment service'-is simply an editorial deci-
sion such as broadcasters and newspapers make all the time." Id. at 385, n.44. Professor Barron
rejects this analysis on the view that it might be possible for the telephone company "to become
the dominant information provider--overtaking broadcasting, cable broadcasting and newspa-
pers it would have more power than government" to affect speech, yet freely able to do so. Id.
Most courts have rejected the view that telephone company decision making on carriage repre-
sents state action. See, e.g., Dial Info. Serv. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1543 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1972 (1992) (finding no government compulsion whether to bill
or not bill for dial-a-porn services). Such a finding would make the refusal to carry or bill for
such material more difficult, since the First Amendment analysis would be undertaken with
closer scrutiny. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (attributing
action of a private company to the state when the company exercises powers traditionally and
exclusively reserved to the state). Censorship, as opposed to editing and business decision
making, would constitute state action. See Carlin Comms., Inc. v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co.,
461 So.2d 1208, 1214 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (finding dial-a-porn messages deemed obscene may
be censored by the telco to serve the traditional state concern about minors' exposure to ob-
scenity).
47. Barron, supra note 46, at 390. "If the telcos as information providers are too quickly
suited with First Amendment armor and labelled [sic] speakers or editors, they can too easily
shed the non-discriminatory access obligations of the common carrier. The end result could be
that the regional telco will not only control who enters the conduit but also what can be said on
it." ld. at 403.
48. The FCC first attempted to create a bright line separation between enhanced service
functions, which are unregulated and subject to robust competition, and basic transport capac-
ity, which is regulated and not robustly competitive. See In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of
the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (final
decision), mod. on recon. 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980),further mod., 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), affJd
sub nor., Computer & Comms. Ind. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983). However, the FCC subsequently decided that structural separation
imposed unnecessary costs and burdens. It opted for non-structural safeguards like account
auditing and the complaint process. See Third Computer Inquiry, Report and Order, 104
F.C.C.2d 958 (1986), mod. on recon., 2 F.C.C.R.. 3035 (1987), further recon., 3 F.C.C.R.
1135 (1988); Phase 11, CC Docket No. 85-229, Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987),
recon. denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 1150 (1988), rev'd in part and remanded sub nom., California v.
FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990), on remand, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571 (1991), rev'd in part and
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consequences of anticompetitive or even well-intentioned, but erroneous
cost allocation grows more acute as LECs aggressively diversify. In the
quest for new profit centers and market access opportunities, the LECs
have successfully invoked a First Amendment publishers' right to access
markets and to use editorial discretion in determining how to serve them
profitably.
VI. REJECTING THE SELF-FULFILLING PROPHESY OF MARKET
CONTESTABILITY AND VANISHING BOTrLENECKS
Implicit in the willingness of courts and legislators to endorse non-
common carriage in lieu of common carriage is"the assumption that com-
petition and low barriers to market entry will ensure ample capacity and a
variety of speakers. Yet in the case of cable television, a non-common
carrier function,49 the Supreme Court rejected the view that cable televi-
sion operators lack bottleneck or gatekeeper control. The Court held that
quasi-common carrier, economic regulation was essential to safeguard
the ongoing viability of broadcast television.O Even as it acknowledged
that cable television operators have legitimate First Amendment rights,
including editorial discretion in program selection and channel assign-
ment, the Court endorsed the mandatory carriage of broadcast television
signals to ensure a degree of program diversity and the opportunity for
television broadcasters to reach audiences increasingly reliant on cable
television bottleneck delivery:
When an individual subscribes to cable, the physical connec-
tion between the television set and the cable network gives the
cable operator bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if
not all) of the television programming that is channeled into
the subscriber's home. Hence, simply by virtue of its owner-
ship of the essential pathway for cable speech, a cable operator
can prevent its subscribers from obtaining access to program-
ming it chooses to exclude. A cable operator, unlike speakers
remanded sub nom., California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Robert M.
Frieden, The Third Computer Inquiry: A Deregulatory Dilemma, 38 FED. COMMS. L.J. 383
(1987); Robert M. Frieden, The Computer Inquiries: Mapping the Communica-
tions/Information Processing Terrain, 33 FED. Comms. L.J. 55 (1981).
49. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1051 (8th Cir. 1978), affd, 440 U.S.
689 (1979).
50. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 129 L. Ed. 2d
497 (1994).
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in other media, can thus silence the voice of competing speakers
with a mere flick of the switch.51
VII. PROVIDING SOME ASPECTS OF COMMON CARRIER INSULATION
FROM LiABiLrrY TO PRIVATE CARRIERS
The Turner case emphasized a functional analysis of market access,
rather than simply concluding that once having qualified for non-
common carrier status, cable television operators cannot be required to
perform any function analogous to common carriage. By extension, such
an analysis might confer some of the liability exculpation benefits of
common carriage in instances where private carriers operate in a manner
analogous to common carriage. Such flexible and incremental responses
to changed circumstances, like inchoate competition and technological
innovations, maintain the viability of the core models.
For example, an incremental approach respecting the com-
mon/private carrier dichotomy could support the ability of electronic
bulletin boards to provide a quasi-public forum for the expression of
views on a two-way interactive basis, with greater diversity and lower
cost than what it currently available.52 Electronic bulletin board systems
operators and commercial information service providers like CompuS-
erve, Prodigy and America On-Line have a keen interest in limiting or
eliminating liability for what they carry. By serving as an electronic fo-
rum, library, newsstand, or distributor, 3 these companies can avoid
having to monitor and censor the content of messages carried over their
networks, thereby creating an environment more conducive to robust
debate and generous contributions to the marketplace of ideas." They
need not be reclassified as common carriers or vested with the rights and
51. 114 S. Ct. at 2466.
52. See Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a Public Forum? Computer Bulletin Boards,
Free Speech and State Action, 81 GEO. L.J. 409 (1992); Patrick O'Neill, Optimizing and Re-
stricting the Flow of Information: Remodeling the First Amendment for a Convergent World,
55 U. PITT. L. REv. 1057 (1994); Eric Schlachter, Cyberspace, the Free Market and the Free
Marketplace of Ideas: Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer Bulletin Board Functions,
16 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENr. L.J. 87 (1993); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will
Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995).
53. while analogizing an on-line, bulletin board to an electronic publisher, a New York
court also characterized such a service as "the electronic equivalent of a talk show .. " Stem
v. Delphi Internet Serv. Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 694, 790 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (considering liability for
use of radio personality's photograph on an electronic bulletin board).
54. For a thoughtful comparison of the Madisonian view, i.e., promoting public delibera-
tion, and marketplace of ideas free speech traditions as applied to new information
technologies, see Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757,
1759-60 (1995).
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responsibilities properly conferred on only bona fide common carriers to
avoid the risk of liability for defamation or serving as unintentional con-
duits for the transmission of obscenity, indecency, or copyrighted
material.55
In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., a court gladly exempted an on-
line information services provider from liability by choosing a "hands-
off' approach to content:
CompuServe has no more editorial control over such a publica-
tion than does a public library, book store, or newsstand, and it
would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine every
publication it carriers for potentially defamatory statements than
it would be for any distributor to do so ....
Technology is rapidly transforming the information industry. A
computerized database is the functional equivalent of a more tra-
ditional news vendor .... 6
Such immunity did not accrue to a buletin-board operator who chose
to monitor the content of messages, thereby moving him closer to the
private carrier role of editor. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv-
ices Co., a New York court held that the Prodigy commercial on-line
information services company rendered itself liable for defamatory
statements carried over one of its electronic bulletin boards, because it
actively assumed the task of monitoring the messages and held itself out
as exercising editorial control:
By actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete notes
from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness
and "bad taste," for example, Prodigy is clearly making decisions
as to content and such decisions constitute editorial control....
Based on the foregoing, this Court is compelled to conclude that
for the purposes of Plaintiffs' claims in this action, Prodigy is a
publisher rather than a distributor.... Prodigy's conscious
choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up
to a greater liability than CompuServe and other computer net-
works that make no such choice.57
55. See Edward V. Di Lello, Functional Equivalency and Its Application to Freedom of
Speech on Computer Bulletin Boards, 26 COLOM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 199 (1993).
56. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding no
liability for allegedly defamatory material where on-line information services provider assigned
editing/moderating control of an electronic bulletin board to a third party).
57. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., 1995 WL 323710 at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995) (citations omitted).
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Vin1. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
Congress has come to the rescue of private carriers in search of
quasi-common carrier insulation from liability while at the same time
retaining its private carrier/publisher status. The Telecommunications
Act of 1996 provides legal protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking
and screening of offensive material, defined as "any action voluntarily
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, exces-
sively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected."58
Congressional legislation has the ironic impact of providing the same
kind of insulation from liability for modem day private carriers who
monitor, censor, and restrict the flow of messages that was available
when common carriers of prior years operated as neutral, transparent
conduits. Prior legislation designed to protect minors from indecent pro-
gramning requires both modem day common carriers and their private
carrier competitors to exercise a degree of editorial control and content
review. 59
IX. A NEw QUASI-COMMON CARRIER OPTION
FOR CABLE TELEvISION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides local exchange carri-
ers with three options when distributing video programming: the local
carrier can be (1) a cable television franchisee; 2) a common carrier; or
58. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 509(c), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996). In Shea on Be-
half of American Report v. Reno, 930 F.Supp. 916, 65 U.S.L.W. 2095 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) the
publisher of an electronic newspaper raised First Amendment challenges to the Communica-
tions Decency Act section that criminalizes use of interactive computer service to send or
display patently offensive materials. The court granted a preliminary injunction holding that the
section would be given strict scrutiny on a challenge that it was overbroad and that a complete
ban on constitutionally protected indecent communications between adults was unconstitu-
tional. See also American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, 64 U.S.L.W. 2794
(E.D.Pa. 1996) (Granting preliminary injunction on enforcement of Communications Decency
Act provisions, 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a), 223(d) (1996), prohibiting transmission of obscene or
indecent material by means of a telecommunications device).
59. See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994) (prohibiting the use of a telephone to transmit obscene
communications, and indecent communications to persons under the age of 18 or to persons
over 18 without that person's consent); implemented in Regulations Concerning Indecent
Communication By Telephone, 5 F.C.C.R. 4926 (1990), on partial recon., 10 F.C.C.R. 665
(1994) (clarifying that Section 223 applies to LECs who may not have a contractual relation-
ship with a provider of indecent programming and that intermediary interexchange carriers
have a duty to inform LECs providing billing and collection services of the nature of such
calls).
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3) a quasi-common carrier provider of an "Open Video System."" When
providing an Open Video System ("OVS"), the LEC must operate
somewhat like a common carrier: it must not discriminate unjustly or
unreasonably, and it must endeavor to make two-thirds of its capacity
available to third parties when demand outstrips capacity. However, it
can avoid many non-common carrier cable television regulations, in-
cluding the need to obtain local franchises or comply with rate
regulation.
X. FLAWS IN HYBRID MODELS
Government tinkering with the common carrier model has made it all
but impossible to apply core principles. This presents two significant
problems:
(1) the telecommunication marketplace is not so competitive
that the common carrier model should no longer apply to ba-
sic services like local and long distance services for
residences and small businesses; and
(2) the FCC and reviewing courts are obligated to apply the
common carrier model, absent liberalization of the responsi-
bilities of common carriers set out in Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934 (which the Congress did not
undertake in its massive rewrite in 1996).1
Common carriers do have First Amendment rights62 and opportuni-
ties to operate in non-common carrier markets. However, such market
60. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 653, 47 U.S.C. § 573 (1996).
61. This statement results from an assumption that Congress must expressly repeal a pro-
vision of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to render such provision
unenforceable. Section 401 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 appears to authorize the
FCC to refrain from enforcing a statutory provision, even in the absence of Congressional ac-
tion to repeal the specific provision. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 401, 47 U.S.C. § 160
(1996). Such latitude would afford the Commission the option of unilaterally eliminating, com-
pletely or partially, the fundamental common carrier requirements imposed by Title II of the
Communications Act. Such carte blanche deregulatory opportunities typically require legisla-
tive action. Indeed, much of what Congress did affecting common carriers in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 specifies the rights and responsibilities of common carriers,
e.g., what constitutes full and fair interconnection. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934
§ 251, 47 U.S.C. § 251 (1996).
62. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas. & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (holding that monopoly common carrier status does not bar public utility from exercis-
ing its F'rst Amendment protected commercial speech rights to advertise); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that public utility not obligated to pro-
vide space in its billing envelope for a citizen's group newsletter). See also Angela J. Campbell,
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diversification cannot diminish their ability to perform common carrier
duties, or of regulatory agencies to perform legislatively mandated du-
ties. For example, Comsat Corporation, the sole United States investor in
the world's primary satellite cooperative, the International Telecommu-
nications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), can pursue non-common
carrier business ventures only to the extent that they do not impede its
ability to meet responsibilities 3 established by the Communications Sat-
ellite Act of 1962:64
We believe that Comsat should not be foreclosed as a matter of
policy from applying its corporate technology and expertise to
the development of new lines of business which will result in
public benefit.... However, notwithstanding prospective public
benefits, Comsat's involvement in diversified lines of business
raises significant public policy problems involving Comsat's
continued ability to carry out its original statutory mission and
fulfill the obligations and responsibilities associated with this
mission. These problems are reflected within the four areas of
concern which we have discussed in detail: (1) the scope of
Comsat's authority as it relates to non-INTELSAT/
INMARSAT lines of business; (2) conflict of interest and other
related problems resulting from involvement in such activities;
(3) competitive advantages in non-INTELSATINMARSAT
markets, flowing from Comsat's unique status as the U.S. Sig-
natory in INTELSAT and INMARSAT; and, (4) cross-
Publish or Carriage: Approaches to Analyzing the First Amendment Rights of Telephone Com-
panies, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1071 (1992).
63. See In re Comsat Study-Implementation of Section 505 of the International Maritime
Satellite Telecommunications Act, 77 F.C.C.2d 564 (1980) [hereinafter Comsat Study]. "We
concluded in the Comsat Study that the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 permits Comsat
to engage in activities which are not inconsistent with its statutory mission. We stated that
Comsat should not be foreclosed from applying its corporate technology and expertise to the
development of new lines of business which would likely contribute to the overall development
of satellite technology and which would be in the public interest. However, we found that
Comsat's involvement in diversified lines of business raised significant public policy problems.
These problems included conflicts of interest resulting from Comsat's involvement in both
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional activities, competitive advantages in nonjurisdictional mar-
kets flowing from Comsat's unique status as the U.S. Signatory to INTELSAT and
INMARSAT, and potential cross-subsidization resulting from the misallocation of jurisdic-
tional and nonjurisdictional costs." Changes in the Corporate Structure and Operations of the
Communications Satellite Corporation, CC Docket 80-634, Second Mem. Op. & Ord., 97
F.C.C.2d 145 (1984) (requiring formation of separate subsidiaries when pursuing nonjurisdic-
tional markets), on recon., 99 F.C.C.2d 1040 (1984); see also First Mem. Op. & Ord., 90
F.C.C.2d 1159 (1982).
64. 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1995).
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subsidization and related problems resulting from the misalloca-
tion of common costs.65
Comsat can pursue such diverse non common carrier businesses as
professional sports, hotel room video programming, and satellite equip-
ment manufacturing, provided the government agency with regulatory
authority can maintain effective oversight of Comsat's core, common
carrier business lines.
Regulatory agencies and Congress typically resort to structural sepa-
ration between corporate subsidiaries involved in core common carrier
and non-common carrier ventures. 6 Such segregation establishes a
"bright line" of demarcation between common carrier and non-common
carrier activities. However, the FCC has grown reluctant to use structural
safeguards because of the real or perceived loss of benefits from econo-
mies of scale provided by a single, consolidated company.67
The FCC has proceeded with aggressive deregulation of common
carriers without regard to maintaining the common/private carrier dis-
tinction. On several occasions, courts have rejected these FCC initiatives
as unilaterally abrogating statutorily mandated common carrier duties. In
a series of Competitive Carrier proceedings commencing in 1979" the
Commission sought to forbear from regulating an increasingly large
category of non-dominant carriers (i.e., carriers "not possessing the mar-
ket power necessary to sustain prices either unreasonably above or below
costs").69 The Commission's rationale for substantial deregulation was
that a strict interpretation of Section 203(a) of the Communications Act
65. Comsat Study, 77 F.C.C.2d at & 511; see also National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC,
740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming conditional right of Comsat to enter non-common
carrier direct broadcast satellite service market through a separate corporate entity).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1995-1 Trade Cases & 70,973, 890
F.Supp. I (D.D.C. 1995) (allowing Bell Operating Companies to resell inter-LATA long dis-
tance telephone service via cellular radio and other wireless ventures subject to several
conditions including the formation of a separate resale subsidiary).
67. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires Bell Operating Companies to form
separate subsidiaries when engaging in the business lines previously prohibited by the MFJ,
viz., providing interexchange, long distance services across Local Access and Transport
("LATA") boundaries and manufacturing telecommunication equipment. Telecommunications
Act of 1996 § 272,47 U.S.C. § 272 (1996).
68. Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020 (1985), rev'd and remanded sub norm,
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom MCI Tele-
comms. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994); Fifth Report and Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 1191 (1984); Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554 (1983), rev'd and remanded
sub nom., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Third Report and
Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (1983); Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59 (1982), recon.
denied, 93 F.C.C.2d 54 (1983); In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive
Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979)
(notice of inquiry and proposed rnlemaking); First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
69. Competitive Carier, First Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 6 (1980).
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would impose unnecessary expense and burden on non-dominant carriers
that could retard service innovation, inhibit price competition, and fa-
cilitate collusion among carrers."
Two portions of the FCC's forbearance policy generated major ap-
pellate court reversals. In MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, the D.C.
Circuit found that the FCC acted arbitrarily and in violation of its statu-
tory authority when (in its Sixth Report and Order in the Competitive
Carrier proceeding) it required all carriers subject to regulatory forbear-
ance to cancel their filed tariffs within six months." The court ruled that
the FCC's shift from permissive forbearance of the tariff filing require-
ment for non-dominant carriers, to a prohibition on tariff filing, violated
the clear language of Section 203 requiring every common carrier
(except connecting carriers) to file tariffs. The court stated that the FCC
could use its discretion only to modify tariff filing requirements and that
a modification could not result in the "wholesale abandonment or elimi-
nation of a requirement."'72
In 1992 the D.C. Court of Appeals considered the legality of the
FCC's Fourth Report and Order in the Competitive Carrier proceeding in
the context of whether the FCC could accord some carriers the option not
to file tariffs at all. On the substantive issue of whether the FCC had
properly interpreted Section 203 to grant such tariff filing flexibility, the
court held that it "is simply not defensible in this court" to modify the
clear requirements imposed by the Communications Act.73 The court held
that the FCC lacked authority to eliminate the tariff filing requirement for
a class of carriers, on either a permissive or mandatory basis:
Whether detariffing is made mandatory, as in the Sixth Report,
or simply permissive, as in the Fourth Report, carriers are, in ei-
ther event, relieved of the obligation to file tariffs under section
203(a). That step exceeds the limited authority granted the
Commission in Section 203(b) to "modify" requirements of the
Act.
74
While "understand[ing] fully why the FCC wants the flexibility to
apply the tariff provisions ... differently" '75 based on market power, the
court had to apply the clear language in Section 203 of the Communica-
70. Competitive Carrier, Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 555 n.1 (1983).
71. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
72. IL at 1191-92.
73. American Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 978 F.2d at 735-36.
74. L at 736.
75. Id.
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tions Act that makes no distinction between carrier types for purposes of
the tariff filing requirement.76
Even though the FCC can argue that tariff filing by some common
carriers is unnecessary and counterproductive, the Commission cannot
unilaterally ignore Congressional directives:77
[O]ur estimations, and the Commission's estimations, of desir-
able policy cannot alter the meaning of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934. For better or worse, the Act es-
tablishes a rate-regulation, filed-tariff system for common-carrier
communications, and the Commission's desire "to 'increase
competition' cannot provide [it] authority to alter the well-
established statutory filed rate requirements." ... "[S]uch con-
siderations address themselves to Congress, not to the courts."78
In Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit vacated the
FCC's order proposing to allow nondominant carriers the option of filing
a range of rates, instead of specific rates." In undertaking a statutory
analysis, the court also deemed irrelevant whether the law supports cur-
rently predominant economic policy. The court held that Section 203(a),
which requires every common carrier to file schedules showing all
charges, does not permit the FCC to allow some common carriers to file
76. 1l The court stated that "[w]hether detariffing is made mandatory, as in the Sixth Re-
port [of the Competitive Carrier proceeding], or simply permissive, as in the Fourth Report,
carriers are, in either event, relieved of the obligation to file tariffs under section 203(a). That
step exceeds the limited authority granted the Commission in section 203(b) to 'modify' re-
quirements of the Act." Il (footnote omitted).
77. In Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986), the Supreme
Court rejected the FCC's attempt to preempt the states on plant depreciation, because Section
152(b) of the Communications Act expressly denied FCC "jurisdiction with respect to (1)
charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with
intrastate communication service.... 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (Supp. 1996). The Court reversed
an FCC ruling that Section 220 of the Communications Act authorized the Commission to
preempt inconsistent state depreciation regulations for intrastate ratemaking purposes. Louisi-
ana Pub. Serv., 476 U.S. at 377. The Commission sought to stimulate innovation and
modernization of the telecommunications infrastructure by prescribing faster depreciation
schedules that would allow telephone companies to recoup investment over a shorter period of
time. Id. at 362. Faster depreciation schedules would result in an unpopular and politically
undesirable upward pressure on local rates. Fearing the potential for higher rates resulting from
FCC regulatory initiatives, state public utility commissions challenged the assertion of jurisdic-
tion as an illegal attempt to regulate intrastate "charges" under Section 152(b) of the
Communications Act. Id at 366. No matter how reasonable, given changed circumstances and
the need to provide a way for telephone companies to accelerate depreciation and speed de-
ployment of new technologies, the clear language of the Communications Act "fences off from
FCC reach or regulation intrastate matters-indeed, including matters 'in connection with'
instate service." Id at 370.
78. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 114 S. Ct. 2223,
2233, 129 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1994) (citations omitted).
79. Southwestern Bell Corp. v. FCC, 43 F.3d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
42 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 3:19
a range of charges. The court referred to the clear language of the Act
and cases interpreting parallel provisions in the Interstate Commerce Act,
which served as the template for the Communications Act.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 now affords the FCC the op-
tion of abandoning common carrier tariff filing requirements. The
Commission can accelerate its abandonment of regulations that maintain
a common carrier/private carrier dichotomy. Ironically, such abandon-
ment will make it harder for the FCC and state public utility
commissions to promote universal access to a broader array of services
considered an essential part of the national information infrastructure.
The Act accords the FCC discretion to abandon common carrier regula-
tion at the same time that it expands the definition of universal service
and the obligations of all carriers to promote or provide such access."
XI. CONCLUSION
Congress, courts, and the FCC have worked aggressively to revise,
revamp, and rewrite the definition of common carriage. In deregulating
and liberalizing incumbent common carriers, they have created a variety
of new and fact-specific privileges, immunities, and options. The
straightforward model of common carriage has evaporated.
Technological innovations and First Amendment interpretations do
not require abandonment of the common carrier model. Rather than
starting where the last reformation of common carriage left off, policy
makers and courts should return to the core concept of common car-
riage.8 Proceeding from this core concept, they can respond to changed
circumstances and need, just as government frequently applies different
time, place, and manner restrictions to First Amendment rights as condi-
tions change.
80. See FEDERAL STATE JOINT BOARD ON UNIVERSAL SERVICE, NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING AND ORDER ESTABLISHING JOINT BOARD, CC Docket No. 96-45, FCC 96-93
(rel. March 8, 1996); Recommended Decision, FCC No. 965-3, 1996 WL 656113 (F.C.C.) (rel.
November 8, 1996).
81. At least one court rejects the view that the FCC can assume unlimited discretion in
determining the regulatory classification of a new service: "We recognize the Commission's
authority to approve services on an experimental basis in an effort to gather important market
data to be used in the completion of a regulatory framework. Moreover,... that discretion is
particularly capacious when the Commission is dealing with new technologies unforeseen at
the time the Communications Act was passed. But that discretion is not boundless: the Com-
mission has no authority to experiment with its statutory obligations." National Ass'n of
Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1200-1201 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citation omitted)
(concluding that the Commission engaged in forbidden statutory experimentation in exempting
from Title I broadcasting regulation lessees of DBS transponder provided by common carr-
ers).
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Common carrier duties should continue to dominate the corporate
culture and practices of companies providing basic local exchange tele-
communication services. Government should permit non-common carrier
market entry only if such ventures are subordinate to the primary com-
mon carrier mission, do not adversely affect the ability to perform this
mission, and are provided by separate subsidiaries. Likewise, govern-
ment should not accept bold assertions that infrastructure development
can only occur if the common carrier is allowed to load the expanded
bandwidth with content it created or acquired.
The manner in which the FCC regulates Comsat Corporation pro-
vides a blueprint for ensuring that a monopoly common carrier serves the
public interest even as it pursues a variety of private carrier and non-
communication markets. Comsat tiles tariffs, follows government in-
structions on matters relating to INTELSAT and INMARSAT and does
not examine content generated by its customers. On those occasions the
FCC has considered it necessary to scrutinize the allocation of costs be-
tween Comsat's common carriage and other activities, and the task has
been made easier by the structural separation between jurisdictional ac-
tivities and other ventures. Like most common carriers, Comsat does not
desire these structural safeguards or the burdens of common carriage.
These restrictions on its corporate flexibility, however, are a small price
to pay for a preferential position in the telecommunication marketplace,
in Comsat's case, the opportunity to serve as the exclusive wholesaler of
INTELSAT and TNMARSAT satellite capacity. 2
Separating content and carriage may somewhat impede the economic
benefits of convergence and vertical integration. But such separation en-
sures that the transporter of content will concentrate on carriage without
regard to content and without preoccupation with finding ways to target
and serve new profit centers in programming markets. The United States
needs such dedication to improving the telecommunication infrastructure
and building networks as a function of demand. Where a business enter-
prise pursues both content and carriage markets without structural
safeguards, it may shape network expansion plans to capture current de-
mand for certain types of content, rather than build to meet the nation's
diverse, future telecommunication requirements.
82. The Communications Satellite Act of 1962 § 101 et seq., 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 es-
tablishes Comsat as the sole United States investor in the two major global satellite
cooperatives. Comsat operates as a "carrier's carrier" by leasing capacity at wholesale rates to
other international carriers who then retail it to end users. See Authorized User Policy, 97
F.C.C.2d 296 (1984), reaffid, 99 F.C.C.2d 177 (1985), affd sub nom., Western Union Int'l v.
FCC, 804 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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Visions of a National Information Infrastructure contemplate univer-
sal access" to a network capable of handing large digital bitstreams
supporting countless applications. Providers of the underlying facilities
providing bit transport need to concentrate on upgrading networks rather
than determining how network deployment can favor their non-common
carrier market forays. The Nil completes the migration from a narrow-
band, primarily point-to-point telecommunication network, to a diverse
system capable of providing services that some consider broadcasting, or
at least outside the realm of conventional common carriage. Yet the very
common carrier functions that have promoted universal service and cost
averaging may be necessary to secure universal access to an even more
robust and expensive array of common carrier services and facilities.
At the very least, the carriers responsible for building the first and
last mile access to the NII should not have the opportunity to pursue pro-
gramming interests in derogation of the traditional view that such
operators not discriminate, engage in unreasonable practices, or favor
corporate affiliates. The common carrier model creates these require-
ments, and it remains incumbent on regulatory agencies to enforce them.
83. One of the key "principles and goals" of the National Information Infrastructure initia-
tive will be to "[e]xtend the 'universal service' concept to ensure that information resources are
available to all at affordable prices." INFORMATION INFRAsTRucrTuRE TASK FORCE, NATIONAL
INFoRMAnIoN INFRAsucruRE PROGRESS REPORT 2 (1994).
